# The road ahead: Dalai towards 2030

> Where are we now, and what will happen to Dalai? One thing is for sure: it has been a good run.

Published 2026-05-12 by Kristoffer Strømdal Wik · https://www.wwwik.no/posts/dalai-future.html · Tags: dalai, project

## The road ahead: Dalai towards 2030

### Introduction
So far in 2026, the main shareholders and management, Simen Spets Storhov and Kristoffer Strømdal Wik, have realized that we just do not have the same capacity for intensity and operations as we did in 2025. Dalai has been a fantastic project, and we have learned more than we could ever have imagined in our wildest dreams. Thanks to amazing supporters, team members, and client collaborations, we have had a great time and built something that actually became real. 

Even though the title clearly looks to the future, this opening paragraph is written in the past tense, almost like a memorial. It is clear that the situation, both in terms of the market and the life situation of the founders, is quite different from when we started this project, slightly disillusioned, two years ago. Geographic distance in the team has made coordination harder, and tough priorities in our academic careers have limited our free time. Because of this, it is absolutely crucial that we look at the time ahead with a realistic and nuanced view.

### Looking back
Right now, it is sad to admit that we cannot keep going with the passive operations we have today. The best thing would have been to just ride the wave of motivation we had during our strong growth phase in the spring of 2025. It is always easy to connect the dots looking back, and it is always easier to be wise after the fact. Even though this post is mainly about figuring out the road ahead, it is always useful to have some concrete background on what Dalai has actually been.

In the spring of 2024, I was invited by Sivert Folgerø and Sven Nevin to be a sparring partner for an AI project they called KIhjelp. The goal was to build AI chatbots using recipes Nevin had seen on TikTok. Over the summer, the project took a more formal shape, and the discussions with our first client, Huma AS (an Oslo-based HR platform), evolved. Simen came on board after the summer on my initiative, and our desire to grow increased even more. 

Clients slowly started coming in, and our technology got more advanced as we tried and failed. We landed local but important clients, including the World Ski Championships (Ski-VM), which was a deciding project for us. We thought we were well paid, but looking back it is easy to see that we could have been tougher on the price. More clients followed, especially sports events, and we got several pilot projects going in different segments. You can see the list of collaborations in the appendix. In particular, a sales sprint over the 2024 to 2025 new year led to strong growth in our customer base through January, February, and March of 2025. 

The absolute high point happened when we, against all odds, landed a contract with Standard Norge and Standard Digital. For us at the time, they were a massive and serious player. We finally got to build something from the ground up, a truly demanding and technical project. The project was a success, and we were well paid thanks to an hourly rate put together by an unnamed partner at PwC. The project stretched from the spring, with the first formal delivery right before the summer holiday, followed by a few more rounds over the summer and fall. It was rewarding, educational, and very inspiring. Still, this was the project that made us realize something was not quite right. By the fall of 2025, we noticed that we were not dedicating enough time and resources to current projects or finding new clients.

### Underlying and triggering factors
With the risk of being wise after the fact once again, we can point to three main reasons for the downward trend. Even if it feels a bit like rubbing salt in the wound, we believe it is useful learning for future projects and our careers. 

1. **The desire for pure art**
It is a pretentious headline, but the turning point is real. A nagging thought in the back of our minds, especially for me, was that we were doing "impure art" and the IT equivalent of dropshipping. No-code software and TikTok recipes were used a lot, even though we saw ourselves as a serious company. This mental disconnect led to a desire for more "real" innovation. 

We started another project called askask, which was embedded shopping assistants on product pages. We bet hard on this in the spring of 2025, mostly because of the increase in other "TikTok-inspired" competitors in the traditional chatbot space. We were no longer early movers here. This took our focus away from where we actually had customer growth. When our two pilot clients for askask cancelled at the last minute, we naively lacked a backup plan. We also did not have a concrete Go-To-Market strategy. When we realized that our biggest competitor Truste was doing much better than us, and how tight the e-commerce market was at the time, our motivation took a hit. This loss of motivation and the wrong priorities with our time and money also stopped us from growing in our normal chatbot segment. 

2. **Who, where, and why?**
Right from the start, in our very first board meeting, we were aware that our lack of organization and roles was a risk for conflict. We wanted to split the ownership based on how much work people put in. This meant an equal split between Simen and me, since we did the vast majority of the work through the fall of 2024. However, things were unclear when it came to Nevin and Folgerø's roles. The impression was that they saw their roles as something they could just step in and out of. They wanted to eat the cake without baking it. Surprisingly, this actually led to very little friction. We were clearly good at managing the unclarified things. 

The main catch came when we asked the questions "where" and "why". "Where" was an issue because physical distance had been a huge advantage for Dalai before. The fact that Simen and I were always within 50 meters of each other was great for quick and informal coordination. This became a problem when Simen moved to Bergen for his Master's at NHH, and I moved to Moholt for my engineering studies at NTNU. This made things harder, and it took time and required tough choices since we both wanted to do well academically. 

By asking the "why" question, we get closer to the core of what Dalai has been and what it can be going forward. The premise has always been that Dalai is a learning project. Even though we joked about million-dollar exits, the focus has been on learning. We wanted to try our best and see if it could become something. And it absolutely became something. Still, when learning is the main focus and this is not a matter of life and death, we have to let the project step aside for other ways of learning. Only time will tell if that was a foolish choice. 

3. **Growing apart**
There is not much to elaborate on here. As cliché as it is, it is probably more about Simen and I growing in a different direction than Dalai, not necessarily growing away from each other. There comes a time when you have to defend the priorities you make. When that happens, it is hard to prioritize a small IT company that does not exactly put food on the table. We are looking forward now, but we will always remember Dalai as a central pillar in our lives. 

### The road ahead
Neither Kristoffer, Simen, nor the board of directors (represented by Chairman Mattis Holt) have managed to come up with concrete proposals for what to do next. Right now, I do not have any great ideas either. What are the alternatives, really? The suggestion is that we use the time leading up to the general assembly to look at different options. 

One option is of course to shut the company down completely. Another, maybe more tempting option, is to shut down operations but keep a cheap-to-run AS (limited company) that can be useful in other situations. For example, for when Simen and Kristoffer want to start something new. Hopefully, that will be something even more sustainable and innovative, but Dalai is at least a good starting point, with a little money in the bank to buy more merch or AI tokens. A third option proposed by Simen is to actively manage the capital by investing it in a portfolio. This obviously comes with a risk and also requires more effort. 

We want proposals, and we welcome them in writing to kristoffer@dalai.no, verbally to Kristoffer, Simen, Mattis, or Håvard, or by phone at +47 40 29 18 87. 

Thank you so much for the journey, and we look forward to Dalai's road towards 2030. Take a look at the picture below for a little throwback to the good times: 

![Dalai throwback](img/snedi.jpg)

Best regards,  
Dalai Solutions AS 
by CEO Kristoffer Strømdal Wik  

________________________________  
CEO and Board Member  

Appendix: 
List of clients based on who we collaborated with (not necessarily paid), as recalled from memory:  

* Standard Norge
* Standard Digital
* SINTEF
* Voiceflow
* Ski-VM
* Holmenkollen Skifestival
* Norseman
* Norway Cup
* Birken Ski
* Birken Sykkel
* Birken Løp
* Oslo Maraton
* Norsk Friidrett
* O-ringen
* Hunderfossen
* Kongeparken
* Ekstremsportsveko
* OnePiece
* VPG
* Huma
* WANG Videregående
* Smartwatt
* Surf Mobility
* Vassfjellet
* TrenHer
* ABES
* Sund Folkehøgskole
* Freidig